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“Creating a Financial Stake in College” is a four-part series of reports that focuses on the
relationship between children‖s savings and improving college success. This series examines: (1)
why policymakers should care about savings, (2) the relationship between inequality and bank
account ownership, (3) the connections between savings and college attendance, and (4)
recommendations to refine children‖s savings account proposals. This series of reports presents
evidence from a set of empirical studies conducted by Elliott and colleagues on children‖s savings
research, with an emphasis on low-income children, relevant to large-scale policy proposals. One
such proposal, The ASPIRE Act, would encourage savings by opening an account for every
newborn child, seeding the account with an initial deposit and progressively matching
contributions, and designating accumulated resources to support post-secondary education or
other targeted uses such as homeownership or retirement. Collectively, these reports build on the
compelling observation that children with savings in their name are given a stake in their future.
As such, they are more inclined to take control over their educational experience and feel more
empowered to attend college and persist through graduation.
Report II presents evidence that structural inequalities have

education institution to act as the “great equalizer” in

created an unequal playing field for low-income families

society. Thus, children‖s savings accounts must be carefully

and their children to build assets. Children in families with

structured to address these inequities for children from

higher incomes and greater assets are more likely to have

low-income families. An institutional theory of savings

relationships with banks and access to other institutional

perspective is helpful to identify the types of structures and

structures that support savings (Beverly & Sherraden, 1999;

mechanisms that promote savings, some of which may be

Sherraden, 1991). Because children‖s savings is an

particularly relevant to an examination of how children

important predictor of children‖s educational outcomes

learn to interact with their finances.

(e.g., Elliott, 2011; Elliott & Beverly, 2011a, b), inequity in
institutionalized opportunities to save and accumulate
wealth among children may weaken the effectiveness of the

Children’s Savings through an
Institutional Lens

children (Sherraden & Barr, 2005). Up until now, it has

Economic socialization theory emphasizes the role that the

According to institutional theorists, institutions provide the

family plays in helping influence children‖s attitudes and

context within which all human interaction takes place

behaviors toward saving. This theory builds on the

(e.g., Nee & Ingram, 1998). Sen (1999) states, “Individuals

commonly held belief that family is one of the key

live and operate in a world of institutions. Our

institutions in which children‖s development takes place

opportunities and prospects depend crucially on what

(e.g., Bronfenbrenner, 1979). According to economic

institutions exist and how they function” (Sen, 1999, p.

socialization

learn

142). Sherraden (1991) provides a broad definition of

financial practices through observing and modeling their

institutions used in this report, “formal and informal

parent‖s behaviors (e.g., Moschis, 1987) as well as through

socioeconomic

education, and they develop skills and strategies through

including the organization of capitalist enterprises and

parental guidance and self-reflection (Webley, 2005). For

voluntary associations, and all the laws, procedures, and

children, saving is almost always connected to a larger

agents

social unit or family and involves negotiating with parents

households” (p. 124).

theory,

children

and

been used primarily to explain saving among adults.

adolescents

(Sonuga-Barke & Webley, 1993; Webley, Levine, & Lewis,

of

the

relationships,

state

that

rules,

affect

and

incentives,

organizations

and

Moreover, many children must rely on some form of

Structural Failure: Why Low
Socioeconomic Status Children Fail to
Save

allowance from their parents as their main source of

An institutional theory of saving builds on the premise that

income. From this perspective, the story of why some

acquisition of financial knowledge and resources are

children may have savings of their own that can be used for

strongly influenced by structural failures related to social

school and others do not is one of the successes or failures

class and race. In describing the American economic

of parents as economic socializers.

environment, Mark Rank (2004) states “the game itself is

1991). Even when they open their own accounts, children
are often supported by parents or other family members.

structured in a way that ultimately produces economic

The act of saving is not purely an individual
act determined solely by human capital or
even social background, but it also requires
access to the capabilities financial institutions

losers” (p. 65). Institutional theory posits that structural
failures make it difficult for low SES families to provide
their children with the connections within and between
financial institutions they need to be able to save and
accumulate assets. Within the framework presented here, a
family‖s SES is based on income, education, occupation,
wealth, and connections to financial institutions. A key

provide.

component of institutional theory is that the act of saving is
not purely an individual act determined solely by human

Conversely, the institutional theory of saving emphasizes
the institutional determinants

of

saving and asset

accumulation and the important role that financial
institutions play in shaping children‖s saving attitudes and
behaviors. This theory is more concerned with the attitudes
and

behaviors

of

low

socioeconomic

status

(SES)

capital or even social background, but it also requires access
to the capabilities financial institutions provide (Sherraden,
1991).
An important way that people connect to financial
institutions in a capitalistic society like the United States is

populations than it is with high SES families and their
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by owning assets (Sherraden, 1991). Sherraden (1991)

since 1979 there has been roughly a two percent decrease in

describes this process of assets begetting assets:

the share of income received by the lowest 20 percent of
households, while the top 20 percent of households

Owning financial assets, for most people, is an

enjoyed a four percent increase (Mishel, et al. 2009).

educational process. People pay attention to the

Following the recent economic recession in 2009, the

investment, manage it, make some successful

lowest 20 percent of households experienced an additional

decisions,

out

decrease of roughly six percent compared with a 1 percent

information, and throughout this process, gain a

increase enjoyed by the top 20 percent of households

greater financial knowledge and sophistication.

(DeNavas-Walt, et al. 2010). About 13 percent of low-income

With this experience, people are likely to display

households with children have a 50-50 chance of

greater interest, greater effort, and greater success

experiencing a drop in income during any given year, and

in additional financial endeavors. This added

60 percent of those households do not recoup their losses

effort, on the average, leads to increased income

within that year (Acs & Nichols, 2010). Income inequality in

and accumulation of assets. (p. 156)

the United States is also apparent by race. Median income

make

some

mistakes,

seek

among white households has risen over the last several
Assuming this is true, structural failings put low SES

decades,

while

black

and

Latino

households

have

children at a competitive disadvantage with high SES

experienced periods of decline (Mishel, et al., 2009). The

children. In this way, financial institutions, which are

median income of white households in 2009 was $30,941

intended to promote saving and asset accumulation at the

compared with $18,135 for black and $15,063 for Latino

individual level, create opportunities for saving and asset

households, or about 59 percent and 49 percent the median

accumulation at the societal level.

income received by white households (DeNavas-Walt, et al.
2010).

In sum, institutional theory suggests that low SES families
who generally do not own assets because of structural

Likewise, household wealth has followed a similar trend.

failings, are less likely to have connections to financial

The top 20 percent of households, for instance, enjoyed an

institutions that are designed to help them save and

11 percent increase in the share of the net worth distribution

accumulate assets. Lack of assets and connections to

between 2001 and 2004 compared with the lowest 20

financial institutions place low SES children in a

percent of households who experienced a decrease of

disadvantaged position from the outset in comparison to

almost an equal percentage (Mishel, et al. 2009). To put

their high SES counterparts, who are more likely to save

this in dollar terms, the top 20 percent of households

and accumulate assets.

received almost $20 million of the net worth in 2004 while

Extent of Income and Wealth Inequality
at the Household Level

the bottom 20 percent of households were in debt about
$11,000 (Mishel, et al. 2009). Wealth inequality also exists
along racial lines. A report released by the Institute on

The extent of income and wealth inequality in the United

Assets and Social Policy in 2010 found that the gap in net

States is far-reaching, favoring a small percentage of

worth between whites and blacks quadrupled over the last

households at the upper end and leaving a majority

decade (Shapiro, Meschede, & Sullivan, 2010). According to

vulnerable at the lower end. These inequalities appear to be

their report, white households held up to $100,000 in

on the rise and are especially evident along lines of class

median net worth in 2007 compared with black families

and race (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, & Smith, 2010; Frank,

who held up to $7,000, or about 7 percent of the net worth

2009; Mishel, Bernstein, & Shierholz, 2009). For instance,

held by white households (Shapiro, et al. 2010). A more
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recent report by the Pew Foundation echoes these findings,

institutional perspective to provide effective economic

specifically that whites held up to $113,148 in median net

socialization to their children. The next section proposes a

worth in 2009 compared with $6,325 held by Latinos and

framework that may help assess how structural failings

$5,677 held by blacks, or six percent and five percent,

affect SES families‖ capacity to effectively economically

respectively, of the net worth held by whites (Kochhar, Fry,

socialize their children.

& Taylor, 2011). While all households experienced a decline
in net worth during the recent economic recession, black
and Latino households experienced substantial declines of

Structural

53 percent and 66 percent between 2005 and 2009

wealth inequality include factors as diverse as

compared with a 16 percent decline in net worth held by
white households (Kochhar, et al. 2011).

Structural Underpinnings of Household
Wealth Inequality

the

underpinnings

U.S.

tax

appreciation

code,
of

of

access

home

household

to

credit,

values,

and

intergenerational transfer of wealth.

Structural underpinnings of household wealth inequality
include factors as diverse as the U.S. tax code, access to
credit, appreciation of home values, and intergenerational
transfer of wealth (for a more detailed account than is
provided in this paper, see Conley, 1999; Lui, Robles,
Leondar-Wright, Brewer, & Adamson, 2006; Oliver &
Shapiro, 2006; Shapiro, 2004; Sherraden, 1991; Williams
Shanks, 2005). Regarding the tax code, for example, the
poorest Americans continue to see their real incomes drop
while at the same time their federal tax rate continues to
rise; in contrast, the richest Americans continue to see their
income rise and their tax rate fall, if they pay taxes at all
(Sherraden,

1991).

The

housing

market

underpins

household wealth inequality between whites and blacks
through (1) more limited access to credit to purchase a
home for blacks, (2) higher prices of credit and interest
rates for blacks, and (3) lower appreciation of home values
among

homes

owned

by

blacks

(Shapiro,

2004).

Intergenerational transfer of wealth (Kotlikoff & Summers,
1981), the Homestead Act (Williams Shanks, 2005), and a
host of other instances of government action or inaction
(Lui et al. 2006) have also contributed to wealth inequality
in America.
Given this well-documented history of structural inequality
in America, it is important to determine whether or not low
SES families are in an unfavorable position from an

Framework for Assessing the Family as
an Effective Economic Socializer
Researchers have identified a number of institutional
features that influence people‖s behavior regarding saving
and asset accumulation. Collectively, these characteristics
“construct”

the

framework

for

understanding

how

institutions shape financial outcomes, and thus can be used
to assess whether institutions have the capacity to provide
children with the types of rules (i.e., institutional structure)
required for promoting saving and asset accumulation. The
constructs are: (1) access, (2) information, (3) incentives, (4)
facilitation, (5) expectations, (6) restrictions, and (7) security
(Sherraden and Barr, 2005).
The family is a type of social institution; in fact, under the
current economic paradigm, families are seen as the
primary institution for socializing children into the adult
economy (e.g., Moschis, 1987). Families of different income
and wealth levels may influence the ability of families to
effectively socialize their children in positive financial
practices.
Below is a short description of the seven institutional
constructs and how each potentially impacts the capacity of
low SES families to save and accumulate assets.
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Access

successful performance. Families are considered to be

Access refers to children‖s ability to connect with a formal

children‖s main source of information on financial issues

banking institution. Research on children‖s saving suggests

(e.g., Moschis, 1987). However, research shows low SES

that the current banking paradigm has failed to provide low

families have less financial knowledge (Loibl, Grinstein-

SES children with the same access to federally insured

Weiss, Zhan, & Red Bird, 2010; Zhan, Anderson, & Scott,

accounts that higher-income children enjoy. For example,

2006) and fewer discussions about family financial matters

Kim, LaTailade, & Kim (2011) use data from the Panel Study

(Bowman, 2011; Sherraden & McBride, 2010) than middle-

of Income Dynamics (PSID) and its Child Development

and upper-income families.

Supplement (CDS) to test whether access to savings among
children 12 to 18 is associated with family economic

Incentives

resources. They find that the more net worth a family has

Incentives are financial rates of return, as well as

the more likely children are to have savings of their own—

nonfinancial “pay offs” for participation. Research shows

that is, assets beget assets. Further, the less economic strain

that low SES families are more likely to use alternative

a family reports, the more likely children are to have

forms of banking such as check cashing institutions or pay

savings of their own. They also find that a father‖s

day loans instead of formal banks (Barr, 2004; Rhine,

education and race are predictors of having a savings

Greene, & Toussaint-Comeau, 2006). With respect to rates

account. In the only study found that uses a sample of low-

of return, these types of financial institutions can actually

income children (household income below $50,000),

be characterized as punitive. For example, Barr (2004)

Friedline (in press) finds that whether or not parents have

estimates that the average loan from a payday lending

savings for their child (age 12 to 15) is predictive of whether

establishment is $300, but the average fee for a single, two-

the child has savings of her own. However, low-income

week loan of $300 is about $54.

children are far less likely to have savings of their own (38
percent) when compared to higher income (household

Facilitation

income of $50,000 or above) children (69 percent).

Facilitation refers to any form of assistance in saving. In the

Moreover, she finds that low-income children are far less

case of children, an important aspect of facilitation is

likely to have parents that have saved for them (56 percent)

whether or not they have parents who encourage them to

than higher-income parents (80 percent). While Ashby,

open a bank account. Children who have parents who

Schoon, and Webley (in press) find, in a British sample,

encourage them to use a bank account save more than

that family income does not have a direct relationship to

others (Webley & Nyhus, 2006). Descriptive data tell us,

children‖s savings, they do find an indirect relationship

however, that low-income children (38 percent) are far less

through parenting style. Higher family income is associated

likely to have a savings account than higher-income

with parents that act authoritatively, which in turn, is

children (69 percent) (Friedline, in press). In addition to

associated with having savings as a child. Overall, these

encouraging children to save in a bank account, families

findings provide some evidence for the proposition that low

also facilitate saving by providing children with an

SES families lack the institutional structure to provide

allowance (Furnham, 1999). For example, Furnham (1999)

children with the same access to the formal banking system

finds that children who receive an allowance are more likely

that higher-income children enjoy.

to save. However, findings are mixed on whether children
living in higher-income families are more likely to receive

Information

an allowance than those living in lower-income families.

Information refers to knowledge about policies, services, or

Mortimer, Dennehy, Lee, and Finch (1994) find that

products, as well as knowledge that may contribute to

income is associated with whether children receive an
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allowance or not in the first place. In contrast, in a sample

federally insured bank than children from higher SES

of high-ability children, Miller and Yung (1990) find no

families. Federally insured banks provide people with safety

evidence of differences in receipt of allowance by income

of deposits in member banks currently up to $250,000.

but they do find evidence to suggest that children living

Having money in a bank also is a protection from theft and

with mothers with higher levels of education were more

natural disasters such as fire or flooding. Savings at home

likely to receive an allowance than those living with

may not be protected from such threats.

mothers with less education. Overall, findings seem to
suggest that low SES children may be less likely to receive

Existing evidence suggests that low SES children start off at

an allowance in comparison to higher-income children.

a disadvantage regarding their family‖s institutional
capacity as economic socializers, in comparison to their

Expectations

high SES counterparts. This situation all but assures that

Expectations are embodied in institutional features such as

low SES families will be more likely to fail at socializing

saving targets and social pressure from staff and peers. A

their children as savers and that low SES children will be

large body of social-psychological research confirms that

more likely to fail to open accounts and accumulate assets.

people tend to try to do what others expect them to do.
formal banking system (Barr & Blank, 2009; Retsinas &

Does Structural Inequality Begin with a
Bank Account?1

Belsky, 2005), and tend to pass these perceptions and

Accordingly to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 67

practices onto their children (Grinstein-Weiss, Spader, Yeo,

percent of all children in the US in 2002 had a bank

Taylor, & Freeze, 2010; John, 1999; Moschis, 1985; Shim,

account (see Table 1, Column 1).

Barber, Card, Xiao, & Serido, 2010).

characteristics such as race and gender, head‖s marital

However, low SES families are more likely to distrust the

However, when other

status, and class are examined, large disparities become

Restrictions

apparent. White, female children who live in households

Restrictions are ways that institutions limit access and use

where the head is married, has a four-year degree or more,

of savings. According to Sherraden and Barr (2005), two

a high-income, and high net worth are far more likely to be

main types of restrictions are constraints on access and

banked than their peers. Other findings include:

constraints on use. Thus, a key way that people restrict


access to their savings is by saving at a formal banking
institution (Sherraden & Barr, 2005). If low SES children



are less likely to be banked, it is reasonable to conclude that



they also are less likely to benefit from the restrictions
banks provide. Being unbanked, can be particularly
harmful to low SES families and children because research

83 percent of high-income and 38 percent of lowincome children are banked, a gap of 45 percent.
74 percent of white and 35 percent of black
children are banked, a gap of 39 percent.
78 percent of children who live in high-net-worth
households and 43 percent of children living in
negative-net-worth households are banked, a gap of
35 percent.

shows that they are more likely to have their savings drawn
down by family and friendship networks if the money is

Among children ages 13 to 17, 50 percent have college

saved somewhere in the house, for example (Chiteji &

savings (see Table 1, Column 2), which is measured

Hamilton, 2002).

according whether or not children have designated a

Security

portion of their savings for school purposes like college.

Security refers to having a safe place to put money. Low
SES families are far less likely to connect their children to a

1

The data reported in this and the next section is original data
generated for the purposes of this report.
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Table 1: Percent of children ages 13 – 17 in 2002 with traditional and school savings, percent of young adults ages 18 – 22 in 2007
with traditional savings and the percent of young adults who have traditional savings in 2007 with traditional savings as children
in 2002 by race, gender, marital status, and class (N=729)
Young Adult Traditional Savers in 2007

Covariates

Percent Children

Percent Children

with Bank Account

School Savers in

in 2002 (n=485)

2002 (n=361)

Percent
Over all
(n=614)

Percent with Bank

Percent with

Account in 2002

Bank Account

& 2007

Only in 2007

(n=449)

(n=165)

White

74

55

90

94

78

Black

35

28

59

74

52

Female

70

53

86

92

72

Male

63

46

83

93

65

Married

73

54

90

95

77

Not Married

47

38

67

81

55

81

58

96

98

84

75

54

91

93

82

53

42

74

87

60

High income

83

64

95

96

91

Moderate income

74

52

90

94

80

Low income

38

31

63

79

54

High net worth

78

60

92

95

84

Moderate net worth

47

31

69

85

55

Negative net worth

43

29

69

83

58

Full sample

67

50

84

93

68

Head has four-year degree
or more
Head has some
College
Head

has

high

school

degree or less

Source: Weighted data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and its supplements, the 2002 Child Development
Supplement (CDS) and the 2007 Transition into Adulthood (TA) supplement. Data are imputed using multiple imputations.
The same children are followed through young adulthood.

Note: Table results are rounded to the nearest percent. For more information on data and methods see Appendix A.
Not surprisingly, fewer children have college savings (50
percent) than simply have a bank account with no college
savings (67 percent). Similar to findings on just having an



negative-net-worth households have college
savings, a gap of 31 percent.
55 percent of white and 28 percent of black
children have college savings, a gap of 27 percent.

account, findings suggest the largest college savings gaps
exist by class and race. For example:



Similar patterns of inequality are seen in young adult‖s
savings (see Table 1, Column 3). High percentages (84

64 percent of high-income and 31 percent of lowincome children have college savings, a gap of 33
percent.
60 percent of children who live in high-net-worth
households and 29 percent of children living in

percent) of young adults are banked in 2007. Almost all
white, female, young adults who live in households where
the head is married, has four-years or more of college, and
live in high-income or high-net-worth households as

children are banked as young adults. The extremely high

children have savings as young adults. In the case of

account ownership rate may be explained, at least in part,

marital status, head‖s education, household income, and

by the fact that this study includes young adults with either

net worth, all children are more likely to have savings as

a checking or savings account. The inclusion of checking

young adults if they had savings as children.

accounts at a time when young adults are becoming less
reliant on parents may help explain why so many young

A 2011 study using multivariate analysis finds that children

adults have an account in the aggregate data. Additional

who had savings are statistically more likely to have savings

findings include:

as young adults after controlling for such things as race,
income, wealth, future orientation, and household size





95 percent of high-income and 63 percent of lowincome young adults are banked, a gap of 32
percent.
90 percent of white and 59 percent of black young
adults are banked, a gap of 31 percent.
92 percent of young adults who live in high-networth households and 69 percent of young adults
who live in negative net worth households are
banked, a gap of 23 percent.2

(Friedline, Elliott, & Nam, 2011). Ashby et al. (2011) find
similar results.

Perpetuating Wealth Inequality: The
Case of Savings Amount in Young
Adulthood
In addition to examining who saves among children and
young adults, this report provides data on the amount of

If young adults have an account as children, they are more

savings young adults have in traditional accounts (see Table

likely to have an account and have more saved as an adult,

2).4 While ownership may help change children‖s attitudes

when compared to children who do not (see Table 1,

and behaviors about college, it is also important that

Column 4). If children have savings at an early age, they are

children are able to finance college. Research on the

more likely to have savings as young

adults. 3

In the

amount children have saved in a regular bank account,

aggregate sample, 93 percent of children with savings also

therefore, is also important for determining whether other

have savings as young adults. In contrast, 68 percent of

types of accounts such as CSAs are needed.

young adults who had no savings as children have savings
as young adults. There is a 25 percentage point difference

On average, the aggregate data indicate that young adults

between the two groups.

have about $2,466 saved (see Table 2, Column 1). While not
enough to pay for college, it could go a long way in helping

While gaps in savings remain by race, gender, marital

children pay for such things as books, school fees, clothes,

status, and class, descriptive findings suggest that all

social events, field trips, software, tutoring, or even a

children are much more likely to be banked as adults in

computer. These are all important resources for children

2007 if they had savings as children in 2002. For example,

achieving positive educational outcomes. For example, it is

although only 35 percent of black children between the ages

no longer sufficient for a student to turn in a hand written

of 13-17 had savings in 2002, 74 percent of this group
continues to have savings as young adults. Similarly, only
52 percent of black children who were not banked as

2

Marital status also has a 23 percent college savings gap.
It should be noted, because data are not collected annually, we
cannot rule out that a child who is 13 in 2002 did not obtain
savings at age 14 – 17, for example. Therefore, it might be that
some children, who had savings in 2007 but not in 2002, had it at
some other point during their childhood.
3

4

Since there is a high amount of missing (roughly 50 percent) on
the savings amount variables among children 13 – 17, savings
amounts are not reported for children. According to Little and
Rubin (2002), a rule of thumb for about how many data can be
missing and still obtain accurate results from multiple
imputations is approximately 20 percent. To give the reader an
idea of the amount children had in savings, average basic savings
without imputing was $1,436.10 in the aggregate sample, and for
college savings it was $388.22. However, due to missing data,
generalizability is questionable and findings are not reported.
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paper without citations. Computers and the internet have
almost become basic survival needs for a student in the 21

Lack of savings for such items can create an unfair

st

educational disadvantage.

century—nearly as important to their success as food,
shelter, and clothing. Finland has made fast internet access
a legal right (Ahmed, 2009), an extreme example that may
become more common. From this perspective, providing all
children with the same opportunity to use computers and
the internet are essential to creating a level playing field.
Table 2: Mean amount of traditional savings among young adults ages 18–22 in 2007, and the mean amount of traditional
savings in 2007 among young adults with and without traditional savings as children in 2002 by race, gender, marital status,
and class (N=729)
Mean Dollar Amount of Traditional Savings among Young Adults in 2007
Covariates
Overall (n=614)

With Traditional Savings in 2002 &

With Traditional Saving Only in

2007 (n=449)

2007 (n=165)

White

2,661

2,716

2,508

Black

1,666

1,404

1,805

Female

2,043

3,024

1,729

Male

2,891

2,181

2,662

Married

2,669

2,686

2,624

Not Married

1,865

2,095

1,664

2,569

2,731

1,844

2,770

2,571

3,397

2,244

2,452

2,007

High income

3,443

3,386

3,756

Moderate income

2,200

2,220

2,141

Low income

1,931

1,979

1,903

High net worth

2,780

2,767

2,834

Moderate net worth

2,139

2,168

2,115

Negative net worth

1,597

1,738

1,490

Full sample

2,466

2,581

2,237

Head has four-year degree
or more
Head has some college
Head

has

high

degree or less

school

Source: Weighted data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and its supplements, the 2002 Child Development
Supplement (CDS) and the 2007 Transition into Adulthood (TA) supplement. Data are imputed using multiple imputations.
The same children are followed through young adulthood.

Note: For more information on data and methods, see Appendix A.
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Young adults‖ savings amounts display familiar patterns of

is the fact that previous models that primarily use an

inequality when disaggregated by race, marital status, and

economic socialization approach are weak predictors of

class but not by gender and head‖s education. Some

young adult savings.2 For example, Ashby, Schoon, and

highlights are:

Webley (in press) find that their economic socialization
model is a weak predictor of young adult savings (McKelvey







Young adults from high-income households have
about one and three quarters more saved than lowincome young adults ($3,443 vs. $1,931,
respectively).
Young adults from high-net-worth households
have about one and three quarters more saved than
young adults from negative-net-worth households
($2,780 vs. $1,597, respectively).
White young adults have about one and half times
more saved than black young adults ($2,661 vs.
$1,666, respectively).

Overall, the descriptive data present a mixed picture for the
proposition that owning savings as a child leads to more
savings as a young adult (see columns 2 & 3). For example,
black young adults who had savings as children have fewer
saving than black young adults who did not have savings as
children. In contrast, with the exception of black young
adults, traditionally disadvantaged groups—specifically,
young adults who are female, who live in households where
the head is single, who live in households where the head
has a high school degree or less, who live in low-income
households, and young adults who live in negative net
worth households as children—save more if they had
savings as a child. Further, in the aggregate data, young
adults who had traditional savings as children save slightly
more on average ($2,581) than if they did not have savings
as children ($2,237).

Leveling the Playing Field: How can
Children’s Savings Programs Help?
Although the descriptive evidence that low SES children are
far less likely to have a savings account in the first place
along with the finding that children‖s savings is associated
with young adulthood savings provide some rationale for an
institutional approach to children‖s saving, additional
reasons exist as well. First, there is evidence of structural
failure and that low SES families are more likely to have low
capacity for being good economic socializers. Second, there

& Zavoina pseudo-R2 equals 13 percent of savings in
adulthood in the aggregate sample and 21percent of savings
in the sample of people who live alone). While pseudo R2‖s
cannot be compared across different datasets, they do
suggest that, in a particular study, a model is either a good
predictor of the outcome or not. Friedline, Elliott, and Nam
(2011), find that their model is a relatively weak predictor of
young adult savings (McFadden‖s pseudo-R2 equals 17
percent or 21 percent depending upon the type of
propensity score analysis used). Similarly, Friedline‖s and
Elliott‖s (2011) model is also a weak predictor of savings
(McFadden‖s pseudo-R2 equals 14 percent among white
young adult savings and 26 percent among blacks).
Based on this evidence, there is solid ground for suggesting
that low SES children may require support from federal
institutions to save and build assets. Such support is not so
unusual. In fact, asset theorists contend that just about all
saving and asset accumulation is made possible by
institutions (Sherraden, 1991). Much of this institutional
support comes through tax incentives directed increasingly
at middle- and upper-income households for the purpose of
helping them save and accumulate assets (Howard, 1997;
Sherraden,

1991).

Common

examples

that

almost

exclusively benefit middle- and upper-income households
are

tax

exclusions

for

employer-sponsored

pension

contributions and earnings (e.g., 401k plans), and the home
mortgage deduction. Low SES families are far more likely
to work at jobs that do not offer 401k plans (Mishel et al.,
2009), and they are far less likely to own their home in the
first place (Rank & Hirschl, 2010). Given this, Sherraden
and Barr (2005) aptly suggest that “until everyone has the
same institutional opportunities and public subsidies for
asset accumulation, it is not possible to know whether their
reactions to institutional structures would be different from
others” (pp. 4-5).
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When discussing institutions within the applied social

incentive of $500 per year in matching funds for amounts

science context, Sherraden and Barr (2005) state that they

saved in accounts. Lastly, children would be able to make

can be thought of as “interventions, designed to alter

tax-free withdrawals.

behaviors and outcomes for individuals” (p. 8). From this
perspective, children‖s savings programs are a type of

Facilitation – Accounts would be opened automatically for

institution developed for the purpose of assisting low SES

all children born in the US when their social security card

children to save and accumulate assets. Child Savings

is issued. Further, the initial deposit and match would be

Accounts (CSAs) have been proposed as a potentially novel

automatically deposited in the children‖s account.

and promising institution meant to promote children
savings and asset accumulation (Boshara, 2003; Goldberg

Expectations – Adopting a national children savings

& Cohen, 2000; Sherraden, 1991). An example of a CSA

program like proposed in the ASPIRE Act would send the

policy is the America Saving for Personal Investment,

message to all children that Americans save for things like

Retirement, and Education Act (ASPIRE). ASPIRE has a

post-secondary

number of features that may help augment low SES

retirement.

education,

home

ownership,

and

families‖ capacity to function as an effective economic
socializer. Below, the institutional framework introduced

Restrictions – Access to funds in the account would be

earlier in this report illustrates how the ASPIRE Act, as

restricted by age and by use. Children could not make a

currently constructed can potentially augment low SES

withdrawal from the account until they turned 18, and they

families‖ capacity to function effectively as economic

would be restricted to use savings for (1) post-secondary

socializers:

education, (2) first-time home purchase, or (3) retirement
security.

Access – “KIDS Accounts,” or a savings account for every
newborn, would be created, ensuring universal access.

Security – The accounts would be federally insured.

Information – Opportunities for financial education would

As proposed, a national savings program would provide

be provided to all children.

children with an account, initial deposit, and match
savings. If it is true that assets beget assets, a national

Incentives – All children would be provided with an initial

savings program may be an important first step to reverse

$500 deposit. Moreover, children living in households with

structural inequality in regards to saving and asset

incomes below the national median would be eligible for an

accumulation among low SES children.

additional contribution of up to $500 at birth and a savings
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Appendix A: Methods
Data. This study uses longitudinal data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and its supplements, the Child
Development Supplement (CDS) and the Transition into Adulthood supplement (TA). The PSID is a nationally representative
longitudinal survey of US individuals and families that began in 1968. The PSID collects data on such items as employment,
income and assets. The CDS was administered to 3,563 PSID respondents in 1997 to collect a wide range of data on parents and
their children, aged birth to 12 years. Questions covered a broad range of developmental outcomes across the domains of health,
psychological well-being, social relationships, cognitive development, achievement, motivation, and education. Follow-up
surveys were administered in 2002 and 2007. The TA supplement, administered in 2005 and 2007, measures outcomes for
young adults who participated in earlier waves of the CDS and were no longer in high school.
The three data sets are linked using PSID, CDS, and TA map files containing family and personal ID numbers. The linked data
sets provide a rich opportunity for analyses in which data collected at one point in time can be used to predict outcomes at a later
point in time and stable background characteristics can be used as covariates. Because the PSID initially oversampled lowincome families descriptive analyses are weighted using the last observed weight variable as recommended by the PSID manual
(Gouskova, 2001).

Savings variables. Four measures of children‖s savings are used in this study: children‖s traditional savings in 2002, children‖s
college savings 2002, young adult‖s traditional savings in 2007, and young adult‖s traditional savings amount 2007.

Children‖s traditional savings 2002: Children ages 13 to 17 are asked whether or not they have a savings or bank account in their
name. This is a dichotomous variable with response options including, yes and no. Data for this variable is available from the
2002 CDS.

Children‖s college savings 2002: If children (ages 13 to 17) have a traditional savings account, they are asked if any of the money
in these accounts is designated specifically for school purposes, like paying for college. This is a dichotomous variable with
response options including, yes and no. Data for this variable is available from the 2002 CDS.

Young adult‖s traditional savings 2007: Children ages 18 to 22 are asked whether or not they have a checking or savings account
in their name. This is a dichotomous variable with response options including, yes and no. Data for this variable is available
from the 2007 CDS.

Young adult‖s traditional savings amount 2007. In the 2007 TA, savings amount is a continuous variable ranging from $.01 to
$9,999,996.

Race, gender, marital status, class and wealth variables . There are six control variables: children‖s race, gender, head‖s marital
status, education level, and household income and household net worth.
Children‖s race, a dichotomous variable (black/white), is available from the 1997 wave of the CDS. Children‖s gender is also a
categorical variable (male/female), which is available from the 2002 wave of the CDS. Head‖s marital status ( married/not

married) is available from the 2001 wave of the PSID.

new america foundation & Center for Social Development

page 17

Head‖s education level is a continuous variable ranging from 1 to 16 and is available from the 2003 wave of the PSID. Each
number represents a year of completed schooling. For example, a head of household who has 12 years of education is considered
to have graduated from high school. Head‖s education is changed into a categorical variable, dividing heads into three groups:
those with a high school degree or less, those with some college, and those with a four-year degree or more.
Household income is calculated by averaging family income for 1993, 1997 and 2002. Income averaged over multiple years
provides the best estimate of permanent income (Blau, 1999; Mayer, 1997). Next household income is changed into a variable
with three groups: low-income (<$33,377), modest-income ($33,377 to $84, 015), and high-income ($84,016 or more).5 Income is
inflated to 2007 price levels using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
Net worth in the PSID is a continuous variable that sums separate household values for a business, checking or savings
accounts, real estate, stocks, and other assets, and subtracts out credit card and other debt. In this analysis, net worth does not
include home equity. Net worth is averaged for 1994, 1999, and 2001. It is then changed into a variable with the following three
categories: negative net worth (< $0), modest net worth ($0~$10,000), and high net worth (>$10,000). 6 Net worth was inflated
to 2007 price levels using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).

Analysis plan. In the first stage of the analysis, missing data are replaced using multiple imputations. Missing data might result
in limitations regarding generalizability of the findings and model comparisons as well as reduced power (Rubin, 1976).
Multiple imputation has been recognized as a preferred method for estimating and completing missing data (Little & Rubin,
2002). This method assumes that missing data occur randomly. To accurately complete missing data, multiple imputations use
information from the observed variables as well as the missing data. The Markov Chain Monte Carlo method is performed to
create five completed, or imputed, datasets with no missing data (Saunders, Morrow-Howell, Spitznagel, Doré, Proctor, and
Pescarino, 2006; Schafer & Graham, 2002). In the second stage of the analysis, the results are then pooled across the five
imputed datasets to reduce bias in the estimations of parametric statistics (Saunders et al. 2006). In the third and final stage,
basic frequencies and means are estimated.

5

Category amounts are based on those used in the US Census Bureau―s Current Population Report Income in the United States: 2002 (De
Navas-Walt, Cleveland, & Webster, 2002). De-Navas-Walt et al. (2002) used five income categories; we recoded into three categories to
increase the sample size within each group.
6 These categories are used in work done by Nam and Huang (2009).
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